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standards—up to a point. The law does not ban strikes in the private sector. Unlike many countries that 
nominally allow strikes but create onerous procedural obstacles (Mexico is a prime example), the United 
States, aside from modest notice requirements, lets workers decide to strike. In a handful of states, 
public-sector workers can strike. 
So far, so good. But beyond this point, U.S. labor law and practice deviate from international standards. In 
the public sector, most strikes are prohibited even with no threat to public health or safety (the main 
proviso developed by the International Labor Organization). In the private sector, employers' power to 
permanently replace workers who exercise the right to strike effectively nullifies that right. 
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of the right of 
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doctrine contrary to the free exercise of 
workers' human rights. 
The committee found that the Ameri-
can labor-law distinction between an 
unfair labor practice strike and an eco-
nomic strike "obfuscates the real issue, 
. . . [which is] whether United States la-
bor law and jurisprudence (the so-called 
Mackay doctrine) are in conformity with 
the freedom of association principles." 
The committee noted, "a determination 
of unfair labor practice . . . 
may take several years until 
the last appeal option has 
been exhausted."4 
A federal court of ap-
peals usually decides 
whether workers were "un-
fair labor practice" strikers 
or "economic" strikers. But 
by then, even with a decision in workers' 
favor, the strike is often long broken and 
workers are scattered to other jobs. 
United States labor law on workers' right to strike meets international human rights standards—up to a point. 
The law does not ban strikes in the pri-
vate sector. Unlike many countries that 
nominally allow strikes but create oner-
ous procedural obstacles (Mexico is a 
prime example), the United States, aside 
from modest notice requirements, lets 
workers decide to strike. In a handful of 
states, public-sector workers can strike. 
So far, so good. But beyond this point, 
U.S. labor law and practice deviate from 
international standards. In the public sec-
tor, most strikes are prohibited even with 
no threat to public health or safety (the 
main proviso developed by the Interna-
tional Labor Organization). In the private 
sector, employers' power to permanently 
replace workers who exercise the right to 
strike effectively nullifies that right. 
Firmly Established 
The right to strike is not expressly men-
tioned in Conventions 87 and 98 of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), 
the main instruments delineating work-
ers' freedom of association. But the right 
to strike has been carefully considered 
by the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association and other supervisory bod-
ies for many decades and is now firmly 
established as "an intrinsic corollary 
of the right of association prot 
Convention No. 87."1 
In 1991, the ILO committee 
a complaint against the Unite 
filed by the AFL-CIO on the pei 
replacement doctrine. It conclud 
The right to strike is one o: 
sential means through which 
and their organizations may 
and defend their economic ai 
interests. The Committee c 
that this basic right is not 
really guaranteed when 
a worker who exercises 
it legally runs the risk 
of seeing his or her job 
taken up permanently by 
another worker, just as 
legally. The Committee 
considers that, if a strike 
is otherwise legal, the use 
drawn from outside the und 
to replace strikers for an in 
nate period entails a risk of deroga-
tion from the right to strike which 
may affect the free exercise of trade 
union rights.2 
The committee's conclusion was couched 
in soft diplomatic language. Under its 
mandate, it does not "level charges at, 
or condemn, governments."3 But with-
in these bounds, the committee clearly 
found the U.S. permanent-replacement 
The Phelps-Dodge Case 
An ultimate legal ruling can be wrong, 
too. In June 1983 at Phelps-Dodge Cor-
poration's Arizona copper mines, 1,200 
miners went on strike. In August, the 
company began hiring permanent re-
placements, protected by the mobiliza-
tion of several hundred state troopers 
and national guardsmen. In a National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) vote 
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in October 1984, replacement workers 
decertified the union. In a 1986 decision, 
the Reagan labor board rejected appeals 
by union members and ruled that they 
undertook an economic strike, not an 
unfair labor practice strike. 
Years later, too late to vindicate work-
ers' rights, Jonathan Rosenblum's Cop-
per Crucible exposed Phelps-Dodge's 
unlawful conduct.5 In a 1990 interview, 
company president Richard Moolick told 
Rosenblum that as of August 1983, "I 
had decided to break the union." This 
is significant because Phelps-Dodge was 
under a continuing legal 
obligation in August 1983 
to bargain in good faith 
with the union. Moolick's 
decision to "break" the 
union when he was obli-
gated to bargain with what 
the NLRB calls "a sincere 
desire to reach an agreement" (the test of 
good faith) evinces an unlawful refusal to 
bargain. 
By then it was too late. In an interview 
shortly before his death, John Boland, 
who served as Phelps-Dodge's attorney 
in the strike, told Rosenblum, "You must 
keep in mind that dear to the heart of 
Moolick was to get rid of the u n i o n s . . . . 
I'm sure that the decisions by Moolick 
as the strike progressed were influenced 
by his long-range decision to obtain a 
union-free shop. In other words, if a 
decision is doubtful about 'do this or 
don't do this'—and the possibility of 
ultimately getting rid of the union was a 
factor anywhere in there—why that's the 
one he'd choose." 
Inherently Intimidating 
The permanent-replacement doctrine is 
used not only against workers' exercise 
of the right to strike. Employers ag-
gressively use the threat of permanent 
replacement in workers' organizing cam-
paigns, raising the prospect of perma-
nent replacement in written materials, 
captive-audience meetings, 
and one-on-one meetings 
between supervisors and 
workers. 
The permanence in 
threat of permanent
 p e r m a n e n t replacement is 
r e p l a c e m e n t . inherently intimidating. 
Workers' freedom of asso-
ciation does not abide abstractly in hu-
man rights instruments or national laws. 
It arises in a real world of sometimes 
converging and sometimes clashing inter-
ests among workers, employers, govern-
ments, and other forces in society. 
Where workers have formed a union, 
exercise of the right to freedom of associ-
ation is not static or episodic. It is rooted 
in a relationship over time between two 
parties. Parties in this relationship accept 
that in the course of collective bargain-
ing, they might resort to economic ac-
Employers 
aggressively use the 
tion—a realization that creates a power-
ful force for resolving their differences 
through mutual agreement. 
Coexistence, conflict, and compro-
mise are more beneficial to the parties 
and society than the alternatives of gov-
ernment control of employment relations 
or unilateral employer power. But this 
basis of mutuality is destroyed when 
employers can seize on workers' exercise 
of the right to strike as an opportunity to 
permanently take away their jobs. 
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